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Political Parties and 
Trade Union Growth in Canada 
Dennis R. Maki 
This study retests the Ashenfelter-Pencavel hypothesis that 
political factors matter, using pooled cross section-time séries 
data on union growth for Canadian provinces and a set ofdummy 
variables representing political party in power in each province. 
Bot h theoretical and practical aspects are presented. 
Récent empirical studies investigating the causes of trade union growth 
in both Canada1 and the United Kingdom2 hâve relied entirely on "économ-
ie" variables, such as employment growth, unemployment rates, the rate of 
change of priées and/or wages, the level or rate of profits, and strike activi-
ty in their spécifications. Although ail of thèse studies cite Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel3 among their antécédents, they choose not to include any political 
variables in their analysis, despite the statistical significance (one per cent 
level) which Ashenfelter and Pencavel obtained for a variable measuring 
"the percentage of the membership in the House of Représentatives which 
is affiliated with the National Démocratie Party". 
This study retests the Ashenfelter-Pencavel hypothesis that political 
factors matter, using pooled cross section-time séries data on union growth 
for Canadian provinces and a set of dummy variables representing political 
party in power in each province. The results support the hypothesis tested. 
The following section of the paper discusses the theoretical underpin-
nings of both the political and économie variables included in the model. 
* MAKI, Dennis R., Professor, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia. 
1 See, for example, R. SWIDINSKY, "Trade Union Growth in Canada: 1911-1970", 
Relations industrielles, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1974, pp. 435-51; and George BAIN and F. EL-
SHEIKH, "Trade Union Growth in Canada: A Comment", Relations industrielles, Vol. 31, 
No. 3, 1976, pp. 482-90. 
2 See B. BURKITT and D. BOWERS, "The Détermination of the Rate of Change of 
Unionization in the United Kingdom", Applied Economies, Vol. 10, 1978, pp. 161-72; and 
Farouk ELSHEIKH and Georges Sayers BAIN, "The Détermination of the Rate of Change 
of Unionization in the U.K.: A Comment and Further Analysis", Applied Economies, Vol. 11, 
pp. 451-63. 
3 See Orley ASHENFELTER and John H. PENCAVEL, "American Trade Union 
Growth: 1900-1960", Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 83, No. 3, 1969, pp. 434-48. 
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The section after that discusses the data employed and présents the empiri-
cal results. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Since labour relations in Canada falls under provincial jurisdiction, it 
is obvious that a retest of the Ashenfelter-Pencavel hypothesis using Cana-
dian data should utilize provincial, as opposed to national data. There hâve 
been several political parties in power in the various provinces in récent 
years, and it is not possible to completely rank them on the basis of how 
"friendly" they are toward organized labour4. Clearly, the New Démocratie 
Party has the closest ties with labour5, and one would expect that if union 
growth is affected by party in power, growth would be greatest at times and 
in places where the NDP is in power. Although it is tempting to go on to 
speculate that the Libéral Party would be more "friendly" to organized 
labour than more "right-wing" organizations such as the Conservative Par-
ty or the Social Crédit Party, there is little évidence supporting such an a 
priori judgment. Hence a set of dummy variables is utilized herein to test 
whether there are différences among parties, with the only a priori sign ex-
pectation being that growth would be more rapid under the NDP than 
under other parties. 
There are a number of ways in which party in power could affect union 
growth. Consider the artificial case of two political parties. Party A has 
strong support from organized labour, both financially and in terms of the 
voting patterns of union members. This party's platform contains state-
ments recognizing the positive value of union organization, and promising 
to aid the growth of unionization in presently weakly organized sectors. 
Party B, on the other hand, has a platform which states that unions are pre-
sently excessively strong, and promises measures to reduce this power. 
Depending upon which of thèse parties gains power, one would expect dif-
férent provisions in provincial labour codes to be enacted, différent re-
course to ad hoc législation ending strikes, and différent public pronounce-
ments by provincial premiers and other government spokesmen regarding 
the desirability of unionization. 
4 In the U.S., there hâve historically been only two major political parties at the Fédéral 
level, and one of thèse (the Démocratie Party) has clearly been more pro-labour than the other. 
For an alternative treatment of political factors, see Arlene HOLEN and Stanley HORO-
WITZ, "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance and Eligibility Enforcement on Unemploy-
ment", Journal of Law and Economies, Vol. 17, 1974, pp. 403-31. 
5 See Richard U. MILLER, "Organized Labour and Politics in Canada", in Richard 
U. Miller and Fraser Isbester (eds.), Canadian Labour in Transition, Scarborough, Ont., 
Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1971, pp. 204-39. 
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Each of thèse différences would in turn affect union growth. It should 
be obvious that the content of provincial labour relations législation can 
hâve such an effect6. Even such minor clauses as whether a union requires a 
majority of the workers in the unit or a majority of the workers voting in a 
certification élection, in order to attain certification, or the length of time 
which elapses between an application for a certification élection and the 
time that élection is held7 can hâve substantial effects on union growth. If 
Party B cornes to power and shows its readiness to quickly end major strikes 
which inconvenience the public through ad hoc législation, this may be in-
terpreted as a décline in union power by workers in the affected sectors, 
making them less willing to become or remain union members. If workers in 
some sector complain of poor working conditions or low wages, and lobby 
for législation to alleviate thèse problems, and a provincial premier re-
sponds that their solution is to unionize and no législation will be forth-
coming, the message is clear. Whatever thèse workers feelings are toward 
unions, they see that under this administration, if they wish to improve their 
lot the route is unionization. 
In sum, when Party A is in power, workers are more willing than other-
wise to join unions because they perceive unions to be more power fui when 
they hâve the weight of the provincial government behind thern. At the 
same time, unions perceive they hâve the "green light" to organize, and 
step up organizing activity because a given expenditure on such activity is 
expected to be more effective when Party A is in power. Finally, some em-
ployers may not resist organization as strongly when Party A is in power as 
otherwise, because they perceive such résistance to be futile ("you can't 
fight city hall"). For ail of thèse reasons, unions should grow more rapidly 
when Party A is in power than when Party B is in power. 
There is, however, another level to the argument, since it is the atti-
tudes of the electorate which détermine which party is elected to power. 
Ashenfelter-Pencavel, citing Chamberlain, argue that législation is not "the 
cause but only the symbol" of public attitudes toward trade unions8. This 
position posits than an exogenous change in attitudes causes a change in 
6 As argued by George Sayers BAIN, Union Growth and Public Policy in Canada, Ot-
tawa, Labour Canada, October 1978, where several examples of législative changes which 
could affect union growth are given. 
7 See Richard PROSTEN, "The Longest Season: Union Organizing in the Last Décade, 
a /k/a How Corne One Team Has to Play With Its Shoelaces Tied Together?", in Proceedings 
of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1978, pp. 
240-9; and Myron ROOMKIN and Hervey A. JURIS, "Unions in the Traditional Sectors: The 
Mid-Life Passage of the Labor Movement", pp. 212-22 in the same publication. 
8 See Orley ASHENFELTER and John H. PENCAVEL, op. cit., pp. 438-9; and Neil 
M. CHAMBERLAIN, The Labor Sector, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965, p. 129. 
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party in power, and this same change in attitudes is sufficient to explain 
changes in union growth. Thus, Ashenfelter-Pencavel argue that party in 
power is merely a proxy for unavailable public opinion poil data on the atti-
tude of the public toward unions. This argument has greatest validity in a 
world where there are only two parties, and thèse parties differ only with 
respect to their platform position regarding unions. 
The real world is, of course, more complex than this. Although union 
members are only a minority of the voting population, they are a substantial 
minority, and no political party can take the risk of completely alienating 
this group. Hence no party in Canadian provincial politics has a strong anti-
union plank in their platform. More important, political parties differ on 
many issues, not merely positions regarding unions. It requires a naive right 
wing-left wing view of the political spectrum, and unique identification of 
unionism with the left-wing end of this spectrum, to claim party in power is 
merely a proxy for public opinion poil data regarding unions. It is perhaps 
reasonably appropriate for U.S. fédéral politics, where there are only two 
major parties, but it ignores the populist nature of parties in Canadian pro-
vincial politics. 
Aside from the political factor, a number of économie variables were 
included in the analysis. Discussion of the theoretical rationale for their in-
clusion will be brief, since thèse variables hâve been used, and discussed, in 
the literature previously cited. The first factor included is a measure of em-
ployment growth, expected to affect the growth of union membership posi-
tively. This expectation is obvious if the employment growth occurred in 
previously unionized establishments with strong forms of union security 
such as closed or union shops. Further, even if ail employment growth oc-
curred in non-union establishments, union membership should not décline. 
Thus, the employment growth variable should be positive, with a magnitude 
such that the change in membership is less than the change in employment. 
The second économie variable included is the unemployment rate. The 
usual arguments for its inclusion note that the demand for union services 
will fall as the unemployment rate rises for three reasons: (i) there may be a 
perception on the part of workers that unions can do less in providing wage 
increases during recession periods, (ii) the consumption foregone by paying 
union dues may represent higher utility in recessions because incomes or ex-
pected incomes are lower, and (iii) for those who are unemployed or uncer-
tain about their employment stability, there may be no perceived advantage 
to being an unemployed union member compared to being an unemployed 
non-union worker. A négative sign is thus expected for the unemployment 
rate. In the current study, which uses pooled cross-section time-series data, 
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the provincial unemployment rate never approached significance. An alter-
native version, the unemployment rate in a province in a given year relative 
to the average unemployment rate in that province over the time period con-
sidered, proved to be a strong variable. Results are presented only for this 
alternative version, denoted RELUR. 
Three other variables were introduced, but dropped from the final esti-
mations. Union density (union membership divided by labour force) was in-
troduced with the expectation of a négative sign under the argument that 
new organization may become more difficult as density increases if the 
more easily organized workers are in fact the first organized. The coeffi-
cients obtained for this variable were positive, with t values occasionally as 
high as 2.0. One ex post rationalization for the failure of this variable to 
perform as expected is that the density values in the sample were low, sel-
dom exceeding 0.4. The argument on sign expectation becomes more plausi-
ble as density approaches unity. 
The lagged year-over-year percentage change in the consumer price in-
dex was introduced with a positive sign expected. The argument hère is that 
workers may be more willing to join unions in inflationary periods if they 
feel that they can thereby better protect their real incomes. Although the 
variable never approached significance (indeed generally produced coeffi-
cients with a négative sign) and its inclusion or deletion had little effect on 
the results for other variables included, thèse results should not be taken as 
évidence that inflation "doesn't matter", because collinearity with other 
variables was a problem. The last variable introduced and subsequently 
deleted was the growth in union membership in ail provinces excluding the 
province in question, with a positive sign expected. This variable, suggested 
by Swidinsky's9 use of the rate of growth of U.S. union membership to ex-
plain the rate of growth of Canadian union membership, wash highly colli-
near with the employment growth and unemployment rate variables. While 
the "other province" membership growth variable was positive with a t 
value in excess of two, the employment growth and unemployment varia-
bles became nonsignificant at the .05 level. 
The important point to note is that the results for the party in power 
dummies are not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the three variables 
which were dropped from the final estimation, whether thèse variables were 
included singly or in combination. 
Finally, a number of variables used by previous researchers were not 
introduced in the current study. Thèse include profit rates, changes in wage 
9 R. SWIDINSKY, op. cit. 
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rates, measures of productivity growth and measures of strike activity. 
Without going into détail, the reasons for not including thèse factors were 
that the theoretical rationale for their inclusion was judged to be very weak, 
and in some cases the variables in question (e.g. wage changes) are probably 
jointly determined with membership growth or affected by some common 
causal factor. 
EMPIRICAL WORK AND RESULTS 
The year-over-year relative change in total union membership is used as 
the dépendent variable in ail régressions, and is hereafter called "the rate of 
growth of membership"10. 
The membership data were available on a consistent basis for the 
period 1962 to 1978, inclusive, at the time of writing, providing sixteen ob-
servations on each province. Unemployment rate data for Prince Edward 
Island hâve been released for only five years in this period, and given the 
means of calculating RELUR, it is impossible to calculate this variable in a 
manner consistent with other provinces for any period. Thus ail observa-
tions for Prince Edward Island were dropped, leaving a total of (nine prov-
inces times sixteen years) 144 observations for ail estimations. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 1. For those who may not 
wish to consult the appendix, PCE is the year-over-year percentage change 
in employment, the political party variables are dummy variables repre-
senting the party in power, with the New Démocratie Party (NDP) being the 
excluded category; and the province variables are also dummy variables, 
with Québec the excluded category. Equations 3 and 4 are simply équations 
1 and 2 after correction for heteroscedasticity. 
The coefficients of PCE and RELUR are statistically significant at the 
.05 level, one-tailed test, and the political party dummies are statistically 
significant in ail estimations except équation (1), using a partial F test at the 
.05 level. Although the province dummies in équations (2) and (4) are not 
significant at the .05 level11, thèse équations are reported for comparison. 
The R2 values are low for time séries data, but not unreasonable given that 
the dépendent variable is in the form of year-over-year proportional 
changes. 
io Some previous studies hâve used central first différences in constructing their dépen-
dent variable, but we find Bain and Elsheikh's argument convincing that there is no rationale 
for thus smoothing the data. See George BAIN and F. ELSHEIKH, op. cit., pp. 485-6. We 
also utilized a dépendent variable which excluded members of government employée unions. 
The results, which are available from the author upon request, are very similar to those report-
ed herein. 
11 In équation (2) they are significant at the .10 level, and in équation (4) at the .25 level. 
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Since pooled cross section time-series data generally exhibit problems 
of both autocorrélation and heteroscedasticity, the dépendent variable was 
regressed on PCE and RELUR province by province. No évidence of auto-
corrélation was observed12, but applying Bartlett's test for heteroscedasti-
city to the standard errors of estimate from the individual province estima-
tions indicated the présence of that problem13. Hence ail observations for 
each province were divided by their respective standard error of estimate 
prior to estimating équations 3 and 414. From a technical point of view, 
équations 3 and 4 are more reliable estimâtes than équations 1 and 2. 
Turning to the coefficient magnitudes, the partial relationship between 
the dépendent variable and PCE can be depicted as: 
dU , d E , dU , U 
= b or = b (1) 
U E dE E 
where U dénotes union membership and E dénotes employment while b is 
the coefficient of PCE in the régression estimâtes. As is évident from the se-
cond version of this équation, any time b is less than unity union density will 
be declining because of employment growth, and the estimâtes of b herein 
are around 0.3. 
Since the "normal" value of RELUR is unity by construction, the im-
pact of this variable is best understood by means of a hypothetical example. 
If the unemployment rate was ten per cent in a given year in some province 
where the average value of the unemployment rate over the 1963 to 1978 
period was five per cent, équation (4) in Table 1 predicts membership 
growth will be 2.5 percentage points lower in that year than in the 
"average" year. The average value of the dépendent variable in the sample 
was 4.6 per cent per year. 
The coefficients of the political party dummies exhibit sign stability 
over the various estimations reported, but the magnitudes and statistical sig-
nificance dépend upon whether the province dummies are included. With-
out the province dummies, the Union Nationale shows up with a large posi-
12 On the basis of Durbin-Watson ratios tested at the .05 level. The ratio for one prov-
ince was in the indeterminate range for négative autocorrélation, and for another two prov-
inces in the indeterminate range for positive autocorrélation. Ail others were in the acceptance 
région for the null hypothesis of no autocorrélation. 
13 See R.L. ANDERSON and T.A. BANCROFT, Statistical Theory in Research, 
Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1952, pp. 141-44. The calculated Chi-Square value was 173.1, with 8 
degrees of freedom. 
14 This procédure is suggested by J.L. MURPHY, Introductory Econometrics, George-
town, Ontario, Richard D. Irwin, 1973, Chapter 13. 
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tive statistically significant coefficient. Since the Union Nationale would 
not normally be classed as a party "friendly" to organized labour, this sug-
gests that the variable is picking up the later stages of the * 'Quiet Révolu-
tion"15, i.e. factors peculiar to Québec, but not necessarily to any particular 
political party or the underlying factors proxied by the variable for that par-
ty. After the province dummies are added, the Union Nationale dummy be-
comes non-significant, and both the Libéral and Conservative dummies at-
tain statistical significance, ail tests being conducted against the excluded 
party, the NDP. The magnitudes of the coefficients for thèse latter two 
dummies are two to three percentage points per year, which is a very sub-
stantial effect. Because some political parties hâve been in power in only 
one or two provinces in the period considered, and some provinces hâve had 
the same party in power throughout the period, we consider it important 
that the province dummies be included to prevent incorrect attribution of 
effects to the political party variables. Equation (4) in Table 1 is thus con-
sidered the most reliable estimate contained herein, but other estimations 
are reported for comparison. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Retesting the Ashenfelter-Pencavel hypothesis has again found that 
political factors are significant in a union growth équation. This suggests 
that it may be fruitful in future research to see if political factors hâve an ef-
fect on other aspects of union activity such as strikes and wage détermina-
tion outcomes, since the theoretical arguments put forth for why political 
factors might affect union growth can be extended easily to thèse other 
aspects. 
15 See Stuart JAMIESON, Industrial Relations in Canada, Second Edition, Toronto, 
Macmillan of Canada, 1973, pp. 40-41. 
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TABLE 1 
Régression Results, Dépendent Viriabie * Proportion»! Change in Union Membership 
Variables 
Intercept 
PCE 
RELUR 
Poiitical Party 
Libéral 
Conservative 
Social Crédit 
Union Nationale 
Parti Québécois 
Province 
Newfoundland 
Nova Scotia 
New Brunswick 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
(1) (2) m (4) 
.073 .128 .062 .093 
(3.13) (3.60) (4.64) (3.23) 
.365 .315 .314 .274 
(2.23) (1.92) (2.95) (2.54) 
-.032 -.045 -.020 -.025 
(-1.90) (-2.61) (-2.17) (-2.62) 
-.011 -.048 -.016 -.033 
(-0.85) (-2.44) (-1.68) (-2.52) 
-.003 -.025 -.017 -.027 
(-.025) (-1.33) (-2.40) (-2.17) 
-.005 -.022 -.006 -.019 
(-0.33) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-1.33) 
.062 .016 .065 .036 
(2.19) (0.44) (1.75) (0.80) 
-.003 -.039 -.011 -.036 
(-0.10) (-0.96) (-0.24) (-0.68) 
.015 .022 
(0.77) (0.68) 
-.011 -.007 
(-0.60) (-0.28) 
-.001 .008 
(-0.05) (0.31) 
-.034 -.017 
(-1.48) (-0.65) 
-.043 -.027 
(-1.80) (-1.05) 
-.037 -.028 
(-1.69) M.18) 
-.019 -.005 
(-0.47) (-0.18) 
-.029 -.015 
(-0.81) (-0.54) 
16 .33 .35 R2 .12 
F test on: 
Poiitical Party 
(d.f.) 
Province 
(d.f.) 
Notes: — t values in parenthèses. 
— Excluded party in the poiitical party dummies is the NDP. 
— Excluded province in the provincial dummies is Québec. 
— Equations 3 and 4 are équations 1 and 2 after correction for heteroscedasticity. 
1.48 2.54 2.49 2.37 
(5,136) (5,128) (5,136) (5,128) 
1.77 1.43 
(8,128) (8,128) 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Définitions and Data Sources 
Dépendent — Year-over-year relative change in the membership of ail reporting labour or-
ganizations. If Ut represents membership in a given year, the dépendent varia-
ble for ail régressions is given by (Ut - Ut_i)/Ut_i- Data from Statistics 
Canada, Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act. Part II, Labour 
Unions (71-202), various annual issues. 
PCE — Year-over-year relative change in the industrial composite employment index by 
province. Data from Statistics Canada, Employment, Earnings and Hours, Seasonal-
by Adjusted Séries (72-206), various annual issues, converted to an annual basis by 
averaging monthly observations. 
RELUR — The average annual unemployment rate in a given province divided by the average 
unemployment rate in that province over the period 1963 to 1978, inclusive. Data 
from Statistics Canada, Historical Labour Force Statistics — Actual Data, Sea-
sonal Factors, Seasonally Adjusted Data (71-201), 1980 for the period 1966-1978. 
For 1963 to 1965 for Québec, Ontario and British Columbia, the "old définition" 
data in Statistics Canada, Canadian Statistical Review, Historical Summary 1970, 
was ratio adjusted to the "new définition" using the 1966-1969 overlap. For 1963 
to 1965 for the prairie provinces observations were calculated using the formula: 
URmt = ^ nia . URopt , where UR dénotes the unemployment rate, n refers to 
"new définition", o refers to "old définition", i indexes provinces within the 
région, p dénotes the prairie région as a whole, and a refers to 1966-1969 aver-
ages. Ail data from sources previously cited. Atlantic provinces handled in a man-
ner similar to the Prairies. 
Political Dummies — Dummy variables interpolated to the nearest tenth based on number of 
days when party in power changed during a year. Information from 
Pierre G. Normandin (éd.), The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 
Ottawa, 1980. 
Partis politiques et croissance des syndicats au Canada 
Le présent article reconsidère l'hypothèse d'Ashenfelter et de Pencavel selon 
laquelle le parti au pouvoir influence le taux de croissance du syndicalisme. Cepen-
dant, alors qu'Ashenfelter et Pencavel soutenaient que le parti au pouvoir ne consti-
tue qu'un simple substitut pour obtenir des renseignements indisponibles sur le com-
portement de l'opinion publique envers les syndicats, cette étude-ci tend à démontrer 
qu'il y a une relation de cause à effet entre le parti politique au pouvoir et le taux de 
croissance du syndicalisme. Cela peut se présenter de différentes façons dont la plus 
manifeste réside dans les modifications aux lois provinciales sans exclure toutefois les 
déclarations publiques sur les bienfaits du syndicalisme et la promptitude à recourir à 
une législation spéciale pour mettre fin aux grèves. 
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Si le parti politique au pouvoir est reconnu pour avoir un «préjugé favorable» 
à l'égard des syndicats, les travailleurs sont plus enclins qu'en d'autres circonstances 
à y adhérer, car ils se rendent compte qu'ils ont plus de force lorsque les syndicats 
ont l'appui du gouvernement derrière eux. De même, les syndicats eux-mêmes ont la 
perception qu'ils ont le «feu vert» et qu'ils peuvent intensifier le travail de recrute-
ment, car ils estiment que les sommes consacrées à l'organisation seront plus produc-
trices que si un autre parti détenait le pouvoir. Enfin, il arrive que des employeurs 
opposent moins de résistance au syndicalisme lorsqu'un gouvernement sympathique 
à cette cause est au gouvernail, car les employeurs considèrent que pareille résistance 
serait futile. 
Étant donné que la législation du travail au Canada est du ressort des provinces, 
il fallait donc, pour vérifier l'hypothèse, des statistiques par province. Les statisti-
ques relatives au développement des syndicats furent regroupées pour chacune des 
neuf provinces, l'Ile du Prince-Edouard étant excluse faute de données. Ces statisti-
ques portaient sur la période de 1962 à 1978 inclusivement. On eut recours à des va-
riables fictives pour représenter les cinq partis politiques qui avaient formé le gouver-
nement dans ces provinces durant cette période. On retint aussi d'autres facteurs 
comme le taux de croissance de l'emploi et les changements cycliques mesurés au 
moyen du taux de chômage. Le changement proportionnel des effectifs syndicaux 
fut appliqué de façon régressive aux variables relatives aux partis politiques, au taux 
de croissance de l'emploi et au taux de chômage. 
Les résultats indiquent que la croissance de l'emploi et le niveau de chômage 
sont des variables qui ont une signification statistique. Il en est de même pour les va-
riables se rapportant aux partis politiques. On y a découvert que le développement 
des syndicats a été d'environ trois pour cent plus faible au moment et dans les pro-
vinces où les partis libéral et conservateur formaient le gouvernement que lorsque le 
Nouveau parti démocratique était au pouvoir. Pour ce qui est du passage au gouver-
nement du Crédit social, de l'Union nationale et du Parti québécois, on n'a remar-
qué aucune signification statistique valable. 
Il serait utile, au cours de recherches futures, de se demander si les partis politi-
ques ont un effet sur d'autres aspects de l'activité syndicale comme les grèves et la 
fixation des salaires. 
